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sex.1	 The	 doctrine	 was	 articulated	 in	 Price	 Waterhouse	 v.	 Hopkins,	
where	an	employer	denied	a	promotion	 to	 the	 female	plaintiff	Ann	
Hopkins	because	she	failed	to	“walk	more	femininely,	talk	more	femi-
ninely,	 dress	more	 femininely,	wear	make-up,	 have	her	hair	 styled,	
and	 wear	 jewelry.”2	 Hopkins	 challenged	 her	 employer’s	 sex-based	
rule	that	expected	women	to	be	feminine.	In	deciding	for	the	plaintiff,	
the	Court	explained	how	protecting	gender	nonconformity	 is	key	to	



































identity	or	gender	 expression	 differs	 from	 the	 sex	 they	were	 assigned	 at	 birth.	See	
GLAAD	 MEDIA	 REFERENCE	 GUIDE	 10	 (10th	 ed.	 2016),	 http://www.glaad.org/sites/	
default/files/GLAAD-Media-Reference-Guide-Tenth-Edition.pdf	[https://perma.cc/	
QZ8M-KHSK].	 I	use	 it	more	narrowly,	 to	mean	those	who	 identify	as	a	different	sex	
than	that	assigned	at	birth,	as	these	transgender	persons	constitute	the	vast	majority	





ognizing	 transgender	 discrimination	 as	 gender	 nonconformity	 dis-
crimination	 on	 the	 theory	 that	 a	 transgender	 person	who	 adopts	 a	
gender	presentation	that	fails	to	conform	to	sex	designated	at	birth	is	
a	 gender	 nonconformer.8	 As	 one	 court	 explained,	 discrimination	
against	a	transgender	person	designated	male	at	birth	who	adopts	a	
feminine	gender	performance	should	be	understood	as	discrimination	
due	 to	 the	 “failure	 to	conform	to	sex	stereotypes	concerning	how	a	
man	should	look	and	behave.”9		
The	Supreme	Court	faced	the	new	law	of	gender	nonconformity	
































	 12.	 Equal	 Emp.	Opportunity	 Comm’n	 v.	 R.G.	&	G.R.	Harris	 Funeral	Homes,	 Inc.	































were	 not	 women”);	 Alexander	 Chen,	 The	 Supreme	 Court	 Doesn’t	 Understand	








17-1618,	 17-1623,	 18-107),	 https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17	
-1618/107019/20190710162958207_tsac%20National%20Womens%20Law%	
































them.	 For	 example,	 in	 the	 lower	 courts,	 Aimee	 Stephens’s	 lawsuit	
turned	 on	 her	 rights	 under	 her	 employer’s	 sex-segregated	 dress	
code.18	She	did	not	seek	to	invalidate	the	dress	code;	she	wanted	to	be	
treated	as	a	woman	under	it.19	These	are	not	cases	where	transgender	
persons	 are	 discriminated	 against	 because	 of	 a	 failure	 to	 conform	
their	 gender	 to	 their	 sex	 assigned	 at	 birth.	 Instead,	 these	 are	 cases	
where	transgender	persons	are	discriminated	against	because	of	what	






























This	 shortcoming	 of	 the	 gender	 nonconformity	 doctrine	 is	 no	












































to	 transgender	 claims.	 Cisgender	 plaintiffs	 are	 seen	 as	 less	 gender	




the	 relative	 weakness	 of	 cisgender	 as	 compared	 with	 transgender	



















































the	 concerns	 of	 some	 commentators	 and	 courts,	 recognizing	
transgender	 discrimination	 as	 sex	 discrimination	 furthers	 the	 anti-
stereotyping	aims	of	sex	discrimination	law.32		
Bostock’s	 failure	 to	 connect	 transgender	 discrimination	 to	 the	
broader	 concerns	 animating	 sex	 discrimination	 law	matters	 legally	
and	socially.	Legally,	the	failure	to	ground	transgender	discrimination	
more	deeply	 in	 fundamental	 government	 interests	 combatting	 core	
sex	discrimination	problems	risks	weakening	transgender	plaintiffs’	
sex	 discrimination	 claims	 against	 religious	 freedom	 defenses.33	 In-
deed,	Stephens	lost	in	the	district	court	to	such	a	defense	because	the	
court	failed	to	appreciate	how	her	claim	helped	to	further	the	anti-ste-
reotyping	 goals	 of	 sex	discrimination	 law.34	 Socially,	 commentators	
have	raised	concerns	that	transgender	persons	reinforce	rather	than	
challenge	sex	stereotypes	that	harm	women,	driving	a	wedge	between	
those	 supporting	 transgender	 rights	on	 the	one	hand	and	women’s	




























transgender	 discrimination	 as	 sex	 discrimination	 and	 the	 shift	 to-


















































ucation,45	 the	military,46	 and	 bathrooms,47	 to	 cite	 just	 a	 few	 exam-
ples,48	and	a	host	of	sex	classifications	have	withstood	judicial	scru-
tiny.49	Many	 scholars,	myself	 included,	 have	 argued	 that	more	 sex-
 



























































while	 “[t]he	mother	 carries	and	bears	 the	 child,	[so]	 .	.	.	 her	parental	 relationship	 is	
clear,”	the	father	must	“grasp[]	[the]	opportunity”	to	become	a	parent	through	post-
birth	actions	(internal	quotation	marks	omitted));	Rostker	v.	Goldberg,	453	U.S.	57,	






























evaluate	employees	by	assuming	or	 insisting	 that	 they	matched	the	
stereotype”—the	 gender	 performance—“associated	 with	 their	
group”—male	 or	 female.55	 The	 Court	 explained	 that	 protection	
against	an	expectation	of	conformity	with	stereotypical	gender	expec-









ceived	 the	 plaintiff’s	 gender.	 In	 Price	 Waterhouse,	 the	 employer	
viewed	Hopkins	as	 “masculine.”59	The	 third	step	of	 the	doctrine	re-




	 55.	 Id.	 at	251.	This	doctrine	has	 since	been	extended	beyond	employment	dis-
crimination	law.	See,	e.g.,	Back	v.	Hastings	on	Hudson	Union	Free	Sch.	Dist.,	365	F.3d	






























































































nation	 claims	 by	 transgender	 plaintiffs,	 they	 consistently	 rejected	



















male	 because	 he	 wants	 to	 become	 a	 female”);	 Terry	 v.	 Equal	 Emp.	 Opportunity	
Comm’n,	No.	80-C-408,	1980	WL	334,	at	*2	(E.D.	Wis.	Dec.	10,	1980)	(dismissing	sex	












































	 69.	 Terry,	 1980	WL	334,	 at	 *3	 (rejecting	 transgender	 discrimination	 claim	be-
cause	plaintiff	“is	not	being	refused	employment	because	he	is	a	man	or	because	he	is	










interpretation,”73	 neither	 of	 which	 encompasses	 discrimination	
against	“a	person	born	with	a	male	body	who	believes	himself	to	be	
female”	or	“discrimination	based	on	 .	.	.	discontent	with	the	sex	into	























	 76.	 See	 id.	at	 1082;	 Sommers	 v.	 Budget	Mktg.,	 667	 F.2d	 748,	 748	 n.2	 (8th	 Cir.	
































basis	 of	 transgender	 status	 is	 not	 discrimination	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 sex,	 “transsexuals	






criminated	against	because	of	her	 status	as	a	 female	 .	.	.	.”);	Kirkpatrick,	 636	F.2d	at	
1048	(considering	whether	plaintiff	had	been	discriminated	against	on	the	basis	of	sex	
because	she	was	treated	differently	than	female	employees);	Dobre,	850	F.	Supp.	at	287	

































tection	 for	 transgender	 persons,	 these	 early	 decisions	 appreciated	
that	transgender	persons	were	changing	their	sex,	not	their	gender.		
B. RECOGNITION:	A	SHIFT	FROM	SEX	TO	GENDER	
Starting	 in	 the	 early	 2000s,	 courts	 began	 applying	 the	 gender	
nonconformity	 doctrine	 to	 cases	 of	 sex	 discrimination	 brought	 by	
transgender	plaintiffs.84	One	of	the	earliest	Court	of	Appeals	cases	to	
reach	 this	 conclusion	was	 Smith	 v.	 City	 of	 Salem,	 Ohio.85	 There,	 the	
plaintiff,	whom	the	Sixth	Circuit	described	as	a	“transsexual”	who	is	
“biologically	and	by	birth	a	male,”	had	been	diagnosed	with	Gender	



































its	Diagnostic	 and	 Statistical	 Manual	 of	 Mental	 Disorders	(DSM-5),	 which	 replaced	
“gender	identity	disorder”	with	“gender	dysphoria.”	AM.	PSYCHIATRIC	ASS’N,	DIAGNOSTIC	































































which	 Smith	 identified	 as	 “feminine,”99	 with	 their	 expected	 gender	
performance,	 which	 was	 masculine.	 Because	 these	 did	 not	




























	 98.	 Complaint	 at	5,	 Smith	v.	City	of	 Salem,	No.	4:02CV1405	 (N.D.	Ohio	 July	19,	
2002).	








the	 transgender	 plaintiff	 designated	male	 at	 birth	 is	 an	 effeminate	
man	discriminated	against	for	failing	to	conform	gender	to	sex.		
In	 applying	 Price	 Waterhouse	 to	 transgender	 plaintiffs,	 courts	
conceive	of	transgender	persons	as	they	did	Ann	Hopkins,	retaining	
the	sex	they	were	assigned	at	birth	and	changing	their	gender.102	The	
doctrine	 itself	 presumes	 a	 change	 of	 gender	 but	 not	 sex.	 If	 the	
transgender	plaintiff	who	is	designated	male	at	birth	and	who	adopts	
a	 feminine	 gender	 performance	 were	 in	 fact	 a	 female	 (or	 if	 the	
transgender	 plaintiff	 who	 is	 designated	 female	 at	 birth	 and	 who	




discrimination	 law’s	 shift	 in	 the	 treatment	of	 sex	 and	gender.103	 As	
Smith	states,	“[b]y	holding	that	Title	VII	protected	a	woman	who	failed	
to	 conform	 to	 social	 expectations	 concerning	how	a	woman	 should	
look	and	behave,	the	Supreme	Court	established	that	Title	VII’s	refer-
ence	 to	 ‘sex’	 encompasses	 both	 the	 biological	 differences	 between	
men	and	women,	and	gender	discrimination,	 that	 is,	discrimination	







extended	 to	 transgender	plaintiffs	 ignores	how	 it	was	a	 change	not	
 
Defendants’	actions,	Smith	has	sufficiently	pleaded	claims	of	sex	stereotyping	and	gen-




	 102.	 In	Smith,	 for	example,	the	Sixth	Circuit	says	that	“[d]iscrimination	against	a	
plaintiff	who	is	a	transsexual—and	therefore	fails	to	act	and/or	identify	with	his	or	her	
gender—is	no	different	from	the	discrimination	directed	against	Ann	Hopkins	in	Price	














persons	 as	 persons	who	 changed	 their	 gender	 rather	 than	 persons	
who	changed	their	sex.106	Over	twenty	years	ago,	Professor	Mary	Anne	
C.	Case	noted	how	sex	discrimination	 law	had	begun	to	speak	of	all	




Smith	obscures	 this	 shift	 in	 its	 discussion	 of	 the	 earlier	 prece-






















































































From	 this	 near	 universal	 acceptance,	 the	 treatment	 of	
transgender	persons	as	gender	nonconformers	only	intensified.	First,	













































































of	 transgender	 status	 is	 unlawful	 .	.	.	 [but]	we	 now	 directly	 hold:	 Title	 VII	 protects	











view,	while	 plaintiffs	 like	 Hopkins	 are	 only	 partial	 gender	 noncon-
formers,	because	they	“reject	discrete	aspects	of	their	prescribed	gen-
der	 code	 while	 maintaining	 conformity	 with	 others,”	 transgender	
plaintiffs	 are	 complete	 gender	 nonconformers	who	 reject	 an	 entire	
“gender	 code.”122	 This	 perspective	 not	 only	 views	 transgender	per-
sons	as	gender	nonconformers,	but	sets	up	transgender	plaintiffs,	ra-
ther	 than	plaintiffs	 like	Hopkins,	 as	 the	paragon	of	 gender	noncon-
formity.	Transgender	persons	have	 thus	gone	 from	questionable	or	
marginal	gender	nonconformers	to	the	paradigm	case.		







gender	nonconformers,	without	 any	other	proof	 of	 gender	noncon-
formity,	and	more	gender	nonconforming	than	their	cisgender	broth-











der	 discrimination,	 protection	 under	 the	 doctrine	 comes	 at	 a	 steep	
cost:	 the	doctrine	both	presumes	and	 reinforces	 transgender	plain-
tiffs’	 birth-designated	 sex—a	 view	 that	 is	 at	 odds	 with	 substantial	
medical	and	legal	authority,	as	well	as	with	what	plaintiffs	often	claim	
to	assert	lawful	access	to	sex-segregated	spaces.	Still	further,	wrongly	
lumping	 together	 transgender	plaintiffs	 and	 gender	nonconformers	
under	the	doctrine	undermines	protection	for	gender	nonconformity.		
 







This	 Part	 begins	 by	 explaining	 how	 the	 gender	 nonconformity	
doctrine	has	led	transgender	plaintiffs	to	lose	in	cases	that	turn	on	sex	
classifications.	It	then	sets	forth	how	the	doctrine	does	harm	even	in	
cases	where	 transgender	 plaintiffs	 prevail.	 Finally,	 this	 Part	 details	








ognize	 discrimination	 against	 transgender	 plaintiffs	 as	 a	 species	 of	
gender	nonconformity	discrimination	along	the	lines	of	Price	Water-
house:	a	transgender	person	designated	female	at	birth	who	has	been	
penalized	 for	 being	 too	masculine	 is	 analogized	 to	 Ann	 Hopkins,	 a	
woman	who	was	penalized	for	being	too	masculine.	I	call	these	cases	
the	 gender	 performance	 cases.	 I	 return	 to	 the	 gender	 performance	
cases	in	the	next	Section.		
































In	 sex-classification	 cases,	 by	 contrast,	 a	 transgender	 plaintiff	
designated	male	at	birth	 seeks	 the	 right	 to	use	 the	women’s	 rather	
than	the	men’s	bathroom	or	comply	with	the	female	rather	than	the	
male	 dress	 code.	 These	 plaintiffs	 are	 not	 challenging	 sex	 classifica-




























	 127.	 See,	e.g.,	 Jespersen	v.	Harrah’s	Operating	Co.,	444	F.3d	1104,	1106	(9th	Cir.	










The	 district	 court’s	 objection	 also	 raises	 a	 more	 fundamental	
question	about	embracing	protection	against	transgender	discrimina-
tion	within	sex	discrimination	law:	whether	it	fails	to	serve—or	per-

















discrimination	 is	 permissible	 in	 these	 contexts.132	 Whether	
transgender	plaintiffs	have	been	discriminated	against	on	the	basis	of	
sex	when	they	are	denied	the	bathroom	or	dress	code	or	other	sex-
based	 access	 they	 seek	 turns	 on	whether	 the	 sex	 discrimination	 is	
 
(9th	 Cir.	 2009)	 (same);	 Complaint	 at	 *7,	 Daskalakis	 v.	 Forever	 21,	 Inc.,	 2016	 WL	
4487747	 (E.D.N.Y.	 Aug.	 25,	 2016)	 (No.	 15-CV-1768),	 2015	WL	 1531240	 (rejecting	
claim	of	transgender	employee	designated	male	at	birth	seeking	right	to	comply	with	




(No.	 18-107),	 2019	 WL	 3958416	 (“While	 the	 employer	 in	Price	 Waterhouse	acted	
based	on	a	stereotype	about	people	of	one	sex,	the	decision	challenged	here—Harris’s	















lawful.133	Note	 that	none	of	 this	has	 to	do	with	gender.	The	gender	






after	being	hired,	 the	plaintiff	 began	wearing	makeup,	 jewelry,	 and	
acrylic	nails	to	work	and	began	using	female	restrooms	en	route.136	





on	 the	 basis	 of	 one’s	 status	 as	 a	 transsexual,”	 it	 explained	 that	 the	
plaintiff	 cannot	hang	her	hat	on	 this,	as	her	claim	of	discrimination	
must	be	based	not	in	“her	transsexuality	per	se,”	but	in	“the	Price	Wa-
terhouse	 theory	of	protection	as	a	man	who	 fails	 to	 conform	 to	 sex	
 


















(per	 curiam)	 (affirming	 without	 explanation	 the	 district	 court’s	 dismissal	 of	 a	
transgender	worker’s	Title	VII	sex	discrimination	claim	based	on	the	employer’s	re-
quirement	that	she	use	the	men’s	rather	than	the	women’s	restroom);	Creed,	2009	WL	










stereotypes.”138	 The	 Court	 rejected	 the	 view	 that	Price	Waterhouse	
“requires	 employers	 to	 allow	 biological	 males	 to	 use	 women’s	 re-
strooms,”	because	“[u]se	of	a	restroom	designated	for	the	opposite	sex	
does	not	constitute	a	mere	failure	to	conform	to	sex	stereotypes.”139	
The	 gender	 nonconformity	 doctrine’s	 premise	 that	 plaintiffs	 retain	
their	sex	and	fail	to	conform	their	gender	to	it	means	that	so	long	as	


















ory,142	 recognizing	 a	 right	 to	 use	 the	 bathroom	 under	 the	 gender	
 
	 138.	 Id.	at	1224.	
	 139.	 Id.	 at	 1225	 (“[A]n	 employer’s	 requirement	 that	 employees	 use	 restrooms	














	 141.	 Whitaker	 v.	 Kenosha	 Unified	 Sch.	 Dist.	 No.	 1	 Bd.	 of	 Educ.,	 858	 F.3d	 1034,	










crimination	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 sex,	 not	 gender.145	 To	 the	 extent	 a	





















nonconforming	 plaintiffs	 of	 the	 past,	 and	 thus	 the	 gender	 noncon-












































































conformity	doctrine	 to	 transgender	plaintiffs	 could	be	based	 in	 the	




decisions.156	 While	 courts	 have	 made	 some	 gesture	 towards	 the	
 






plaintiff’s	 legal	 name	 change	 and	 changes	 to	 her	 driver’s	 license,	 voter	 registration	
card,	and	Social	Security	documents	indicating	plaintiff	is	female:	“[h]aving	included	
facts	showing	that	his	failure	to	conform	to	sex	stereotypes	of	how	a	man	should	look	





977,	 1002	 (1998)	 (Blackmun,	Brennan,	&	Marshall,	 JJ.,	 concurring)	 (“[A]	 disparate-





















discriminator’s	 perception	 of	 the	 plaintiff’s	 gender	 nonconformity,	
these	cases	still	state	and	apply	the	doctrine	as	premised	in	actual	gen-





























































the	 latest	medical	authority	and	as	a	matter	of	 law.	While	 the	 “old”	
view	of	sex	turns	on	a	designation	made	at	birth,	 typically	based	 in	
anatomy,160	 the	 “new”	 view161	 of	 sex	 is	 premised	 on	 an	 “internal,	






























1:16-cv-236)	 [hereinafter	 Ettner]	 (“The	 term	 ‘gender	 identity’	 is	 a	well-established	







“gender	 identity,”	under	 the	 terms	of	 sex	discrimination	 law,	 it	 is	 a	
marker	 of	 sex—who	 one	 is—rather	 than	 of	 gender—what	 one	
does.164	 And	 despite	 this	 confusing	 terminology,	 proponents	 of	 the	
new	view	of	sex	make	clear	that	gender	identity	is	determinative	of	
legal	 sex.165	To	be	clear,	 the	Article	does	not	 intend	 to	endorse	any	
particular	view	of	sex,	but	highlights	this	new	view	of	sex	to	demon-
















	 163.	 Denise	Grady,	Anatomy	Does	Not	Determine	Gender,	Experts	 Say,	N.Y.	TIMES	


























sex-related	 characteristics[,]”	 including	 internal	 “gender	 identity[,]”	
then	“a	more	careful	consideration	of	sex	assignment	is	needed.”171	In	
these	cases,	“[m]edicine	and	science	require”	that	the	carefully	con-
























































that	 reflect	 a	 person’s	 identified	 sex	 rather	 than	 birth-designated	
sex.179	Under	the	State	Department’s	policy,	transgender	persons	can	
obtain	 such	a	passport	by	 submitting	certification	 from	a	physician	







	 176.	 See	Adkins,	 supra	 note	165,	¶	22	 (“Both	post-mortem	and	 functional	brain	
studies	that	have	been	done	on	the	brains	of	individuals	with	gender	dysphoria	show	
that	 these	 individuals	 have	 brain	 structure,	 connectivity,	 and	 function	 that	 do	 not	
match	 their	 birth-assigned	 sex.”);	 Expert	 Report	 of	Walter	 O.	 Bockting,	 Ph.D	 ¶	 32,	
Schroer	v.	Billington,	424	F.	Supp.	2d	203	(D.D.C.	2006)	(No.	05CV01090)	[hereinafter	
































legal	 sex	 for	 purposes	 of	 federal	 employment	 law.184	 It	 would	 be	









	 182.	 See	 Changing	 Birth	 Certificate	 Sex	 Designations:	 State-by-State	 Guidelines,	
LAMBDA	 LEGAL	 (Sept.	 17,	 2018),	 https://www.lambdalegal.org/know-your-rights/	
article/trans-changing-birth-certificate-sex-designations	[https://perma.cc/6UML	
-987X].	For	a	sampling	of	the	language	of	specific	state	laws,	see,	for	example,	ID	Doc-













































classification	 cases.	 While	 we	 might	 view	 this	 as	 a	 worthwhile	
tradeoff—victory	in	the	gender	performance	cases	at	the	cost	of	loss	
in	the	sex	classification	cases—this	is	a	bad	bargain.	These	losses	are	
serious,188	 and,	 as	 this	 Article	 later	 shows,	 the	 tradeoff	 is	 unneces-
sary.189		
C. UNDERMINING	PROTECTION	FOR	GENDER	NONCONFORMITY	


























Scholars	 writing	 in	 this	 area	 have	 noted	 a	 troubling	 trend:	 as	
transgender	plaintiffs	were	winning	cases	under	the	gender	noncon-
formity	 doctrine,	 traditional	 gender	 nonconformers	 were	 losing	
them.190	Even	after	Price	Waterhouse,	courts	have	upheld	sex	discrim-





Smith,	 and	 the	en	banc	decision	affirming	 it	 two	years	 later.192	 The	
plaintiff	 in	 that	case	challenged	her	employer’s	policy	of	mandating	







































of	 cisgender	 plaintiffs	 are	 sex	 classification	 cases,	 like	 Jespersen.196	
Still,	to	the	extent	that	some	transgender	plaintiffs	have	had	success	
even	 in	 sex	 classification	 cases—dress	 code	 cases	 and	 bathroom	











mance	cases	 following	Smith	v.	City	of	 Salem,	 378	F.3d	566	 (6th	Cir.	2004),	 such	as	
Barnes	v.	City	of	Cincinnati,	401	F.3d	729,	737	(6th	Cir.	2005));	Yuracko,	supra	note	14,	




























and	 females.”).	Case	notes,	 for	example,	 that	 in	1996,	 there	were	“fewer	 than	half	a	
dozen	sex-segregated	public	schools”	in	the	United	States,	but	that	“[b]y	2006,	there	







expectations.199	 She	 argues	 that	 transgender	 plaintiffs	 can	 present	









suggests,202	 but	 from	 wrongly	 applying	 the	 gender	 nonconformity	
doctrine	to	transgender	plaintiffs,	who	should	not	be	understood	as	





I	do	not	go	so	 far	as	 to	stake	a	causal	claim	that	 the	success	of	
transgender	 plaintiffs	 has	 led	 to	 the	 failure	 of	 cisgender	 plaintiffs.	
 
clothing	show	that	“[b]etween	1965	and	1985,	boys	sported	long	hair	and	wore	boldly	




























First,	 comparing	 transgender	 and	 cisgender	 cases	 under	 the	




sen.	 It	 is	 now	 the	 transgender	 plaintiff	 rather	 than	 the	 cisgender	
plaintiff	 who	 represents	 the	 paragon	 of	 gender	 nonconformity.203	
Transgender	persons	often	enjoy	an	assumption	of	per	se	gender	non-
conformity,	 and	 courts	 and	 scholars	 have	 sometimes	 seen	 them	 as	
more	extreme	examples	of	gender	nonconformity	than	the	cisgender	
plaintiffs	of	the	past.204	As	transgender	plaintiffs	are	seen	to	embody	







harm	 that	 gender	 conformity	 imposes	 on	 the	 plaintiff.	 Folding	
transgender	 plaintiffs	 into	 the	 gender	 nonconformity	 doctrine	may	
thus	set	the	bar	unrealistically	high	for	cisgender	plaintiffs.206		
This	 evidentiary	 difference	 will	 not	 only	 make	 transgender	
claims	 seem	 like	 the	 stronger	 claims,	 but	 also	 the	 more	 appealing	
claims,	as	they	are	bounded	in	ways	that	the	cisgender	claims	are	not.	
Because	 they	 are	 established	 by	 objective	 evidence,	 transgender	























Bostock,	 Aimee	 Stephens,	 sought	 the	 right	 to	 comply	with	 her	 em-
ployer’s	dress	code	for	women.210	 In	support	of	her	claim,	Stephens	




the	 accepted	 standard	 of	 care.212	 Jespersen,	 a	 cisgender	 woman,	
sought	an	exception	 to	her	employer’s	dress	 code	 for	women.213	 In	
support	of	her	claim,	she	presented	her	own	testimony	that	she	was	




order	 because	 they	 seek	 to	 dismantle	 the	 sex	 discriminatory	 rules	
they	challenge.215	When	cisgender	plaintiffs	have	been	offered	exemp-
tions	 to	 sex-based	 policies,	 they	 have	 rejected	 these	 offers.216	 The	
 
	 207.	 See,	e.g.,	 Jespersen	v.	Harrah’s	Operating	Co.,	444	F.3d	1104,	1113	(9th	Cir.	








der	 identity	 disorder]”);	 see	 also	 Yuracko,	 supra	 note	 14,	 at	 791	 (arguing	 that	
“transgender	plaintiffs	are	able	to	use	medical	evidence	of	their	GID	to	convince	courts	























ing	 areas	 of	 generally	 accepted	 sex-based	 classifications,	 like	 bath-
rooms	 and	 grooming.	 Nor	 do	 judges	 have	 to	 worry	 about	 unduly	
interfering	with	the	 leeway	the	 law	typically	affords	employers	and	







wear	dresses.	.	.	.	 [I]t	would	not	be	at	all	 illogical	 to	 include	 lipstick	 .	.	.	and	































rules,	 as	 it	 is	 the	 cisgender	plaintiffs	who	have	 tended	 to	 challenge	
them.		
Finally,	wrongly	treating	transgender	and	cisgender	cases	under	












evidence	 about	 the	 importance	 of	 gender	 conformity—the	 im-
portance	of	conforming	the	transgender	plaintiff’s	gender	presenta-
tion	 to	 their	 identified	 sex.222	 And,	 indeed,	 gender	 conformity	may	
have	 unique	 and	 understandable	 value	 for	 transgender	 persons.223	
This	need	for	gender	conformity	may	be	more	relatable	and	persua-
sive	to	judges	staffing	the	federal	bench	than	the	need	for	gender	non-






the	 clothing	 Stephens	 would	 wear	 at	 work.	.	.	.	 Rather	 than	 challenge	 the	 [Funeral	









































crimination.226	 This	 is	 because,	 as	Bostock	 holds,	 a	 decision	maker	
cannot	act	on	the	basis	of	transgender	status	without	acting	on	the	ba-
sis	 of	 sex.227	 This	 theory	 corrects	 the	 error	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 treating	
transgender	discrimination	cases	as	gender	nonconformity	cases:	un-
derstanding	transgender	status	as	a	matter	of	gender	rather	than	sex.		
But	 while	 Bostock	 avoids	 the	 main	 pitfall	 and	 the	 associated	




















of	 transgender	discrimination	 to	 the	 social	phenomenon	of	 sex	dis-
crimination,	 and	 instead	 suggests	 that	 the	 two	phenomena	 are	dis-
tinct.	In	so	doing,	the	decision	fails	to	elucidate	how	transgender	plain-
tiffs	 further	 the	 anti-stereotyping	 aims	 of	 sex	 discrimination	 law,	
treating	these	plaintiffs	as	marginal	cases	rather	than	part	of	the	core.	
This	can	cause	harm	legally,	when	transgender	rights	claims	are	pitted	










discrimination	 is	 sex	discrimination,	 and	how	 it	 corrects	 the	 short-
comings	 of	 the	 gender	 nonconformity	 doctrine.	 Next,	 it	 addresses	
how,	notwithstanding	the	advance	that	Bostock	represents,	the	deci-
sion’s	 approach	 falls	 short	 by	 setting	 transgender	 discrimination	





pret	 bans	 on	 discrimination	 “because	 of	 .	.	.	 sex”228	 to	 apply	 to	


























fied	as	a	male	at	birth	but	who	now	identifies	as	a	 female.	 If	 the	employer	
retains	 an	 otherwise	 identical	 employee	 who	 was	 identified	 as	 female	 at	













lower	 courts’	 near	 universal	 reliance	 on	 the	 gender	 nonconformity	
 
a	transgender	man,	having	a	female	sex	assigned	at	birth	and	desiring	to	or	actually	
















	 235.	 Id.	at	1743	 (“If	more	 support	 for	 our	 conclusion	were	 required,	 there’s	no	
need	to	look	far.	.	.	.	Consider	three	of	our	leading	precedents.”).	









Bostock’s	 textual	 approach	 to	 treating	 transgender	 discrimina-
tion	as	sex	discrimination	has	both	benefits	and	costs.	First,	and	most	
importantly	 for	 purposes	 of	 this	Article,	 this	 theory	 of	 transgender	
discrimination	as	sex	discrimination	avoids	the	substantial	shortcom-
ings	 of	 the	 gender	 nonconformity	 doctrine.	 By	 referring	 to	 a	
transgender	 woman	 as	 a	 person	 who	 was	 “identified	 as	 a	 male	 at	
birth”	but	who	now	“identifies	as	a	female,”238	Bostock	gets	one	thing	





that	Stephens	was	ever	a	man.241	Critically,	 then,	 this	 theory	of	dis-
crimination	 does	 not	 rely	 on	 a	 fixed	 notion	 of	 sex	 designated	 at	


































der	 the	 gender	nonconformity	doctrine.	Regardless	of	whether	 this	



























conformity	 theory	 may	 continue	 to	 problematically	 reinforce	 the	
 































based	action,	 so	 there	 is	no	question	 that	any	such	actions	are	“be-
cause	of	 sex.”	The	only	question	 is	whether	 such	 actions	 “discrimi-
nate”	in	the	way	that	the	law	prohibits,251	that	is,	whether	transgender	



































































































voked	 in	 cases	with	 transgender	plaintiffs,	 it	 should	be	 adjusted	 to	
avoid	the	problems	with	the	doctrine	that	are	the	subject	of	this	Arti-
cle.	Instead	of	operating	under	a	per	se	assumption	about	the	relation-









































in	 the	 distasteful	 and	 counterproductive	 project	 of	 defining	 gender	
conforming	behavior	and	assessing	deviation	from	it.		
Second,	as	a	matter	of	fact,	there	is	no	necessary	or	per	se	rela-
tionship	 between	 sex	 and	 gender	 that	 motivates	 discrimination	
against	transgender	plaintiffs.	It	is	not	the	case	that	a	transgender	per-
son	 who	 was	 designated	 male	 at	 birth	 and	 has	 a	 feminine	 gender	
presentation	would	necessarily	be	perceived	as	an	insufficiently	mas-
culine	man.	 This	 person	may	 be	 perceived	 not	 as	 an	 “insufficiently	
masculine	man,”	but	as	an	“insufficiently	feminine	woman.”263	We	can	
see	precisely	this	in	a	case	where	the	employer	was	concerned	not	that	












































what	 it	does,	 so	 that	 is	 the	appropriate	place	 to	begin.	Perhaps	 the	
most	revealing	analysis	is	to	contrast	the	Bostock	opinion	with	other	
















































































Such	a	 rule	would	 create	a	 curious	discontinuity	 in	our	 case	 law,	 to	put	 it	
mildly.	Employer	hires	based	on	sexual	stereotypes?	Simple	test.	Employer	





















was	 an	 opportunity	 for	 the	 Court	 to	 draw	 parallels	 between	
transgender	discrimination	and	other	forms	of	discrimination	that	oc-
cur	on	the	basis	of	sex.	The	court	declined	to	do	so.	Instead,	the	opin-













unlawful	sexual	harassment,	even	 if	 this	 type	of	discrimination	was	
not	“the	principal	evil	Congress	was	concerned	with	when	it	enacted	




discrimination’s	 core	 anti-stereotyping	 aim—and	 indeed	 to	 suggest	









restrictive	means	of	 furthering	 that	compelling	governmental	 inter-
est.”284	In	the	district	and	appellate	court,	Stephens’s	employer,	a	fu-
neral	 home,	 pressed	 a	 RFRA	 defense	 to	 her	 sex	 discrimination	
claim.285	
Looking	at	the	Sixth	Circuit’s	decision	rejecting	the	defense,	RFRA	















	 285.	 See	Harris	 I,	201	F.	Supp.	3d	837,	863	(E.D.	Mich.	2016)	(upholding	the	de-
fense);	Harris	II,	884	F.3d	560,	595–97	(6th	Cir.	2018)	(rejecting	the	defense).	
	 286.	 Harris	II,	884	F.3d	at	595.	In	Burwell	v.	Hobby	Lobby	Stores,	Inc.,	which	upheld	










antidiscrimination	 rights	 might	 raise	 some	 alarm	 bells.288	 Indeed,	
some	of	the	commentary	on	Bostock	has	to	do	with	the	way	the	Court’s	
religious	 freedom	 jurisprudence	will	 limit	 the	 rights	 granted	 in	 the	
case:	what	rights	 the	Court	giveth	 in	Bostock,	 it	has	(or	will)	 taketh	


































a	ministerial	exception	 to	employment	discrimination	 law	grounded	 in	 the	Religion	
Clauses	of	the	First	Amendment	and	applying	it	beyond	the	head	of	a	religious	congre-
gation).	
	 289.	 Linda	 Greenhouse,	 The	 Many	 Dimensions	 of	 the	 Chief	 Justice’s	 Triumphant	
Term,	 N.Y.	TIMES	 (July	 16,	 2020),	 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/16/opinion/	
supreme-court-roberts-religion.html	 [https://perma.cc/NR3M-BF8J]	 (stating	 that	
“employers	now	can’t	fire	someone	for	being	gay	or	transgender,	but	we	have	yet	to	
see	the	carve-outs	that	the	religious	right	will	demand	and	to	which	the	court	may	well	













































































































cern	 in	Stephens’s	 case	could	still	 apply:	whether	seeking	access	 to	





and	 what	 this	 means	 for	 solidarity	 (or	 lack	 thereof)	 between	
transgender	 persons	 and	 their	 advocates,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	
women	and	their	advocates,	on	the	other.	While	mainstream	women’s	
rights	 groups	 have	 typically	 supported	 transgender	 rights,303	 there	
















	 303.	 These	 groups	 filed	 an	 amicus	 brief	 in	 support	 of	 Stephens	 in	 the	 Supreme	
Court.	 See	 Brief	 of	 the	 National	 Women’s	 Law	 Center	 and	 Other	 Women’s	 Rights	
Groups	as	Amici	Curiae	in	Support	of	the	Employees,	supra	note	15.	




































As	 to	 the	descriptive	 claim	 that	 transgender	persons	 are	more	
gender	conforming	than	cisgender	persons,	transgender	persons	rep-






























sociations	 that	 make	 cross-gender	 manifestations	 especially	 pain-
ful.311	Many	transgender	persons	endure	substantial	hardships	to	ex-
press	 their	 identified	 sex,	 and	 thus	 the	 ability	 to	 adopt	 “a	 single	
identity	within	the	binary	may	therefore	be	very	important.”312	And	
retaining	existing	sex	binaries	may	be	more	important	to	transgender	



















































a	 person	 designated	 female	must	 display	 a	 certain	 sort	 of	 feminin-
ity.321		
We	 can	 see	 this	 sort	 of	 sex	 stereotyping	 logic	 at	 play	 in	
transgender	 cases	more	 broadly.	 Consider	 the	 Schroer	 case.322	 The	
plaintiff	there,	a	transgender	person	who	was	designated	male	at	birth	












































tion	 because	 transgender	 discrimination	 is	 motivated	 by	 the	 same	
sorts	 of	 sex	 stereotypes	 that	 have	 long	 been	 recognized	 to	 hold	
women	and	men	back	on	the	basis	of	their	sex.	I	have	begun	to	take	up	




discrimination,	 the	 new	 law	 of	 gender	 nonconformity	 sent	 courts	


































But	 the	 Bostock	 decision	 was	 an	 incomplete	 corrective	 to	 the	
problems	 of	 the	 new	 law	 of	 gender	 nonconformity.	 Its	 thin	 formal	
analysis	 fails	 to	 connect	 transgender	 discrimination	 to	 long-recog-
nized	forms	of	sex	discrimination	that	are	core	to	sex	discrimination	
law’s	anti-stereotyping	aims.	This	separation	of	transgender	discrim-
ination	 from	 sex	 discrimination	 brings	 its	 own	 costs,	 in	 terms	 of	
transgender	discrimination	claims’	vulnerability	to	religious	freedom	
defenses	 and	 social	 solidarity	 between	 transgender	 rights	 and	
women’s	rights.	So	while	 the	possible	 fall	of	 the	new	 law	of	gender	
nonconformity	 is	a	welcome	development,	what	rises	 in	 its	place	 is	
equally	important.	It	is	critical	that	courts	and	commentators	develop	
a	rich	account	of	how	bringing	transgender	discrimination	within	the	
fold	of	sex	discrimination	furthers	the	historic	role	of	sex	discrimina-
tion	law	in	bringing	an	end	to	sex	stereotypes.		
	
 
	 330.	 140	S.	Ct.	1731	(2020).	
